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Tlic author explores the role of critical realism as the dominant epistemolo;^y in the
science-and-religion dialogue. He presents the historical and philosophical peculiarities of
this approach that have lead to its preeminence. Asking whether "science and religion " would
benefit from greater epistemological variety, he presents a possible alternative to critical re-
alism: enactionisni, as articulated by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch
in their book The Embodied Mind. Enactionism is norproposed as the replacementfor criti-
cal realism, but the author wonders how science and religion woidd look given an enactionist
epistemology.
In 1966 lau Barbour published Issues in
Science and Religion. This text inaugurated
the contemporary dialogue between religion
and science. In its second section. "Religion
and the Theories of Science," Barbour com-
pares and contrasts the methodologies of sci-
ence and theology. He concludes that there
are both significant similarities and differ-
ences between the ways these two realms of
inquiry operate. Some of the differences arise
because the two modes of inquiry ask distinc-
tive types of questions about distinctive types
of experience. The distinctiveness of experi-
ence reflects the underlying fact that science
and religion deal with dissimilar aspects of
reality.' Yet despite this incongruence,
Barbour is committed to the idea of a "wider
search for coherence and synthesis which
leads to a concern for metaphysics." " This
wider search is aided by Barbour's epistemol-
ogy: he identifies himself as a critical realist.
What this epistemological perspective entails
for the science and religion dialogue is the
topic of this paper.
Barbour's advocacy of a critical realist
epistemology has had far-reaching implica-
tions. Critical realism has become the domi-
nant epistemology in the dialogue between
science and religion.^ Why is this the case?
From a sociological perspective, it could be
argued that the dominance of critical realism
has to do with the stams of its advocates within
the overall science-and-religion dialogue.
Barbour, the "grandfather" of the modem dia-
logue, strongly espouses it. So too do Arthur
Peacocke and John Polkinghorne. two other
foundational figures.'* ITie writings of all three
of these thinkers form a central portion of an
emerging "canon" in the science-and-religion
field, thanks in large part to the Science and
Religion Course Program. This program,
which seeks to promote the teaching of
courses in science and religion by offering
$10,000 grants to faculty who teach them,
includes these authors in its "Brief Bibliogra-
phy in Science and Religion," as well as in
the bibliographies of many of its "model"
courses.
While a sociological analysis of the domi-
nance of critical realism along these lines could
be faiitfiil, here the focus will be on the philo-
sophical sources of critical realism's success.
Critical realism apparently offers scholars in
science and religion something that other epis-
temologies do not. What is this? What is it
about critical realism that makes it seem the
obvious, or best, choice for so many people
working at the interface of science and reli-
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gion? And what might this dialogue look Hke
if a different epistemology were employed?
To understand the appeal of critical real-
ism as an epistemology. it is necessary to make
explicit what is implicit—an underlying com-
mitment to ontological realism. The entities
postulated by theologies and scientific theo-
ries are not merely instrumental constructs.
They are intended to be interpreted as actu-
ally existing in the world (or beyond it. in the
case of some theologies). Of course, it is im-
portant to qualify this claim, particularly for
science. The entities proposed by science have
a dual nature. Tliey are, on the one hand, in-
tended to refer to real entities. At the same
time, however, their ontological status is ac-
knowledged to be provisional until such time
as their existence is confirmed by experiment.^
When, exacdy, the existence of theoretical
entities is sufficiently confinned to grant them
"actual" existence is a debated issue. For the
current discussion, however, the significant
point is the intention. Scientific realists do not
propose entities merely for instrumental pur-
poses. It is assumed that these entities are be-
ing proposed because entities '"something like
them" acmally exist in the world.
The case of theology is in some ways more
complicated than science, because theology,
by and large, is not in the business of propos-
ing the existence of entities. To be sure, the-
ology does speak of entities, but the most
important of these. God. is not proposed by
theology. Rather, the existence of God is an
assumption of theology. Many theologians are
concerned with explicating the relationship of
God and humans or God and the cosmos— or
trying to understand the nature of the divine
being itself. This last, in particular, makes
theological realism somewhat different from
scientific realism. Because of the radical dif-
ference between God and creation— God is
infinite while creation is finite—Thomas
Aquinas, following Maimonides. asserted that
any attribute proposed of God, while mean-
ingful, is unlike that same attribute applied to
ourselves. So. while one may speak of God
as love, this love is unlike the love that can be
experienced. This creates problems for a re-
alist interpretation of theology. How can any
theological reflections on God be understood
to have a referent, if Gods infinity makes God
wholly unlike the things postulated of God?
This epistemological conundrum opens
the door for critical realism. Theologically,
one may not wish to refute in its entirety
Thomas's claim about the discontinuity be-
tween God and the world. To do so would
iruike God a being like beings in the world
and create problems for understanding God
as creator and the world as creation. How-
ever, by adopting a critical realist stance, it
may be possible to maintain the transcendence
of God, while at the same time allowing that
some knowledge of the divine can be gained.
How is this accomplished?
Critical realism asserts that all knowledge
is inherently partial and incomplete. As op-
posed to naive realism, which says that one
directly confronts the "objective" world in
one's perceptions, critical realism views
knowledge of the world as mediated. This
mediation has a variety of sources. One's per-
spective is limited, due to the constraints im-
posed by one's locatedness in the world, and
by the physical structure of the senses (and
by extension, the structure of sense-extend-
ing technologies). Perhaps more significant
is the claim that all knowledge, scientific and
theological alike, is symbolic. Overlooking
this symbolic nature leads to literalism in both
fields.^ The importance of this recognition of
the symbolic nature of thought is that since
symbols are abstractions, they cannot repre-
sent all the feamres of their referent. Thus, in
symbolic thought some aspects of the refer-
ent are always neglected.' Knowledge of the
world is inherently partial, due to constraints
of the thought process. These constraints (viz.,
of locatedness, of our physical senses, and of
our symbolic thought) account for critical
realism's claim that all knowledge is partial,
but it remains to be shown how this claim of
the inherent incompleteness of knowledge
helps overcome the problem of reference in
theological language about God.
While the attributes one predicates of God
cannot be taken literally, symbolic language
allows the construction of metaphors. In meta-
phors, knowledge is applied from an area of
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fainiliaiity to a novel or unknown area.^ WTieu
one speaks of God as love, this is a metaphor.
Human experience to understand the divine
being. Is this simply poetic language? George
Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue that it is not:
metaphors are not just poetic or rhetorical:
rather, they are found in all modes of human
knowledge. Significantly, metaphors figure
prominently in scientific discovery. "^ What is
the status of knowledge acquired from meta-
phorical thought? As Janet Soskice asks:
[Hlow can we claim that these
metaphorical terms are in some sense
descriptive, or as I prefer to say, reality
depicting, prior lo and without
definitive knowledge of reality?"^
Soskice is a critical realist, and in order to
answer this question from a realist perspec-
tive she turns to theories of reference. In par-
ticular, she relies on the work of Saul Kripke
<uid Hilaiy Putnam. The essence of their theo-
ries, according to Soskice, is that "reference
depends, in normal speech, as much on con-
text as on content and that reference is an ut-
terance-dependent notion." " She then cites
the work of Richard Boyd to make the transi-
Neither science nor religion, on a critical
realist interpretation, can provide complete
knowledge ofthe world, because each is a
limited enterprise —limited by both its
methods and its specific symbol system.
For those interested in establishing a fruit-
ful dialogue between science and religion,
this has obvious benefits.
tion from metaphor in normal speech to meta-
phor in science. '-
Through her use of theories of reference,
Soskice tries to establish that metaphors can
have a positive cognitive content despite the
unknown nature of the entities they are used
to describe. Following Kripke. she concludes
that this provides for a realist interpretation
of metaphorical theoretical terms. '^ Descrip-
tions of the theoretical entities may be com-
pletely mistaken, but the context in which they
are proposed still allows the claim that what
they tire intended to refer to is a real thing. With
such an epistemology in place, metaphorical
explications of the divine nature can be under-
stood to have real referents even if those ex-
plications can never be entirely adequate.
In so far as critical realism recognizes that
knowledge of the world is inherently liinited.
it is an extremely useful epistemology for the
science-and-religion dialogue. This utility
owes much to the epistemic humility it calls
for in both science and theology. Neither sci-
ence nor religion, on a critical realist inter-
pretation, can provide complete knowledge of
the world, because each is a limited enter-
prise—limited by both its methods and its
specific symbol system. For those interested
in establishing a fruitful dialogue between
science and religion, this has obvious benefits.
Since neither field can legitimately claim to
be the only path to complete knowledge of
the world, a strong polarization of the sides is
subverted.
Critical realism also entails a further claim
that makes it appealing to those interested in
questions at the inter-
face of science and re-
ligion. According to
Barbour, realists in gen-
eral (and critical realists
in particular) deny the
premise that the real is
limited to the observ-
able.'" In place of
observability, Barbour
proposes intelligibility
as the hallmark of real-
ity.'^ Tiiis greatly ex-
pands the realm of the
real, making it much more accommodating to
the kinds of non-observable entities dealt with
in theology. As long as the theories of theol-
ogy meet acceptable standards of evaluation,
standards that share criteria with those pro-
posed for the evaluation of scientific theories
(e.g., fruitfulness, coherence, simplicity, ex-
planatory power), they can be taken to be real-
ity-depicting, according to Barbour's criteria
of intelligibility. This is not simply a clever
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way of allowing theology to claim that its lan-
guage about God has an actual referent. The
same move from observability to intelligibil-
ity is applied in the realm of science to argue
for the existence of theoretical entities that are
non-obsei-vable both in practice and in prin-
ciple. Critical realism opens the door for dia-
logue between science and religion by prevent-
ing either side from monopolizing knowledge-
claims, and by extending the realm of the real
in a way that is conducive to theology. This
facilitation of dialogue is, I believe, the pri-
mary reason why this epistemology has taken
on a central role in the science-and-religion
dialogue.
The acceptance of critical realism has also
been based on contextual factors. The science
and "rehgion" dialogue has been accused of
being a misnomer; the dialogue is not between
science and religion, but primarily between
science (and particular sciences, at that) and
Christianity. While this is changing— the Sci-
ence and Religion Course Program, for ex-
ample, is explicitly trying to estabhsh a dia-
logue in Islamic Africa and the Middle East —
there have also been attempts to justify this
Critical realism opens the doorfor dia-
logue between science and religion by
preventing either side from monopolizing
knowledge-claimsy and by extending the
realm ofthe real in a way that is condu-
cive to theology. Thisfacilitation ofdia-
logue iSy I believey the primary reason why
this epistemology has taken on a central
role in the science-and-religion dialogue.
bias. Peacocke argues that the bias towards
Christianity results from the historical fact that
modem science emerged in a predominantly
Christian enviroimient. This historical circum-
stance, combined with the claims to epistemic
authority made by both science and Christian-
ity, have resulted, at times, in clashes between
science and Christianity— hence the need for
a dialogue.'^ The emphasis on Christianity has
had broader repercussions than simply limit-
ing the dialogue to the perspectives of one re-
ligion (diverse as Cliristianit>' is): it has also
limited the dialogue to Westeni philosophi-
cal perspectives. This is important, as critical
realism relies heavily on certain assumptions
of Western philosophy.
Critical realism proposes that there is a
world "out there": a world separate from and,
for the most part, independent of the obsei'ver.
Realist ontology accords with the intuitive
sense of the way the world is— there are
"things" in the world. Realist epistemology
then argues that knowledge of the world is
knowledge of these "things.*" Underlying both
this ontology and epistemology is a distinc-
tion, a separation, between knower and
known. The knower is removed from the
world that is known. This subject-object du-
alism has led to all inaimer of difficulties for
Western philosophy. In particular, if knowers
are separate from the world, how can reli-
able knowledge of the world be gained? This
subject-object dualism is Descartes's legacy
to Western philosophy, and critical realism is
but one in a long Une
of attempts to answer
I this question.'^
Critical realism
rests on the idea that ob-
jects of the external
world are represented
in the mind symboli-
cally. These symbols,
though inherently lim-
ited in their ability to
depict "reality," none-
theless fairly accurately
represent the world.'^
This kind of mental rep-
^ resentation emerges
from a cognitivist, or computationalist, phi-
losophy of mind, in which the mind is essen-
tially a symbol-processor/manipulator. '^ Be-
cause the mind is limited to information-pro-
cessing tasks, it can be analyzed and discussed
independently of its particular physical mani-
festation and the world in which it finds it-
self."" Thus. Descartes's separation of mind
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and body remains alive and well in critical
realism.
While critical realism accepts the
cognitivist account of the mind, cognitivism
has been challenged within cognitive science.
Alternative theories of the mind have been pro-
posed that attempt to do away with Cartesian
dualism— some more radically than others.-'
II' cognitive science has questioned the valid-
ity of a mind separated from the physical world,
why has religion-and-science, via critical re-
alism, remained content with cognitivism? For
one thing, it fits neatly into a Christian frame-
work: the idea of a mind that is more or less
independent of the specifics of the physical
world accords easily with traditional Christian
notions of the soul. For another, the cognitivist
view of the mind does not challenge the idea
of an objective, mind-independent world, of-
ten associated with science.
The consonance between cognitivism and
ideas of the soul evidences the primacy of
Christianity in much of science and religion.
If the science-and-religion dialogue were
dominated by a different religious tradition,
specifically one that does not have a notion of
the soul, would critical realism have been as
likely to become the basic epistemology? it
seems reasonable to speculate that a world-
view that does not see the person as having an
immaterial "essence" would not frame episte-
mological questions in terms of the problem
of knowing an external, independent world. A
worldview that does not posit the knower as
independent of the world would likely not fix-
ate on Descartes's and Locke's question—how
can immaterial minds have knowledge of the
material world? Without the split between
mind and body, subject and object, a realist
ontology that posits a world "out there" would
not seem intuitively obvious.
The dominance of critical realism in the
science-and-religion dialogue, like the domi-
nance of Christianity, has a great deal to do
with the historical and cultural context in
which the dialogue has, for the most part,
taken place. This raises a number of questions.
The overarching question is this: Is critical
realism the most productive epistemology for
this dialogue? This complex question needs
to be broken down in order even to begin to
answer it. A few starting questions inight be:
How is "productivity" to be assessed? What
are the boundaries of the dialogue? If it is pre-
dominantly Christian, the answers will be very
different than if the dialogue is explicitly in-
ter-religious. What are the goals of the dia-
logue? How these goals are established relates
both to the boundaries of the dialogue and to
the issue of how productivity is assessed.
Proponents of critical realism could argue
that its predominance is itself evidence of its
productivity. If a better theory existed, surely
it would be the one everyone uses. They could
also claim that within a Christian context criti-
cal realism is the best choice. If they are to be
self-reflexive, however, they must acknowl-
edge that this judgment is predicated upon
certain philosophical coimnitments, the most
significant among which, I believe, is the in-
dependence between mind and world. If this
connnitment were set aside, would other epis-
temologies become at least as productive, if
not more so, for the dialogue?
Francisco Varela. Evan Thompson, and
Eleanor Rosch have constructed an alterna-
tive to critical realism's view of the mind.
Their alternative, called enactionism, is pro-
posed over and against the two main strands
of Western epistemology— realism and ide-
alism. Both of these traditions are based on
the shared assumption of mental representa-
tion. In the former case, representation is used
to recover an external world, while in the later
it is used to project the internal world of the
mind onto the exterior world." Varela et al.
believe that they can side-step many of the
epistemological questions endemic to West-
em philosophy by rejecting altogether the idea
of cognition as representation. Instead, cog-
nition is seen as "embodied action." By this
they highlight two things. First, cognition can-
not, as in cognitivism, be discussed in abstrac-
tion from its physical manifestation. Cogni-
tion is intimately related to the kinds of expe-
riences available to the particular kinds of
physical beings that humans are. This includes
not only human biology, but also psychologi-
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cal and cultural coutexls. Second, coguition
is a form of action. That is. sensor>' and mo-
tor processes are inseparable: cognition is a
lived process.-'
For Varela etal., the view of mind is based
on an underlying Buddhist philosophy. This
philosophy, articulated most fully by
Nagarjuna. argues that nothing has indepen-
dent existence; all being arises co-depen-
dently.'^'* This idea of in-
terdependence finds a
modern counterpart in
ecology, but in the Bud-
dhist context it takes on
metaphysical signifi-
cance. The claim is not
simply that all things are
related to other things, but
that this rclatiouality pre-
cludes the idea of any
"thing" having truly inde-
pendent existence. This
ontology is the basis for
the rejection by Varela ct al. of the dualism
inherent in cognitivism. Knovver and known
are not separated but are. in fact, intimately
related. Thus, the epistemology implied by
their "enactionist'" philosophy of mind is very
different from critical realism. Knowledge is
not preexistent, but is "enacted in particular
situations.'"^
Critical realism, it must be noted, also
denies a simplistic idea of preexisting knowl-
edge—that is, facts about the world that exist
independent of the knower. This is the view it
ascribes to naive realism. Critical realism ac-
knowledges that human knowers play some
role in knowledge "construction." hence the
provisional status it accords to human knowl-
edge. The "constructive" role of the knower,
however, is a rather modest one. Peacocke
argues that the human role in the generation
of knowledge is limited by subjecting knowl-
edge-claims to critical evaluation.'*^ This pro-
cess, on a realist account, can bring theories
into better and better accord with the way
things "actually" are. It is important for criti-
cal realists to liinit the human contribution in
this way. Peacocke sees the strong program
in the sociology of knowledge as an example
of what happens when the human input to
knowledge-claims goes unchecked. He sees
such programs as undermining fniitful dia-
logue between science and religion, because
all truth claims degenerate into ideological
commitments. The end result is that the sci-
ence-and-religion dialogue would become
nothing more than "a purely sociological in-
quiry or exercise in the history of ideas." ^^
The sociology ofknowledge claims that
theories about the world are heavily
influenced by socio-cultiiralfactors^ but it
does not make the more radical claim that
the world 'Htself^ is altered in any direct
sense by the way one knows it. Enaction-
ism, on the other handy does make this
more radical claim.
Does enactionism run into the same prob-
lem because of its emphasis on the role of the
knower? It seems that it does not. The sociol-
ogy of knowledge rejects the idea that one can
have "objective" knowledge, because it rejects
the idea that one can have unmediated access
to the world "out there." In this claim,
enactionism is similar to critical realism. But
whereas critical realism, based on an under-
lying realist ontology, claims that there is a
world "out there" that knowledge can come
closer and closer to approximating, the strong
program of the sociology of knowledge re-
jects this progressionist vision of science.
One's theories always are, and always will be,
heavily reflective of one's own socio-cultural
biases.-**
Both critical realism and the sociology of
knowledge share a Western philosophical per-
spective in which there is a one-way divide
between epistemology and ontology— while
ontology may influence epistemology, epis-
temology does not affect ontology. The soci-
ology of knowledge claims that theories about
the world are heavily influenced by socio-
cultural factors, but it does not make the more
radical claim that the world "itself is altered
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iu any direct sense by the way one knows it.
Enactiouism. on the other hand, does make
this more radical claim. The coupling that
takes place between knower and known means
that there is "no fixed, permanent substrate
or foundation" to the world; there is no ob-
jective world for theories to be about in isola-
tion from those who hold the theories.-" Note
that the claim here is not that there is no "ob-
jective" world, but rather that such a world
must include human knowers in their activity
as knowers. "Objectivity," in the sense of "'the
world as it is in itself." is redefined in a way
that removes the subject-object split.
By shifting away from a worldview based
on the assumptions of Western philosophy,
enactionism avoids Peacocke's fear that a
thoroughgoing involvement of the knower in
the production of knowledge implies a loss
of objectivity. It does, however, require that
objectivity as it is postulated in Western
thought be reconsidered. WTiat does this mean
for the science and religion dialogue? Could
enactionism be as productive for meaningful
dialogue as critical realism? Given Barbour's
claim that scientists generally are realist in
their view of science,^*^' a theoiy that chal-
lenges realist ontology could undennine the
credibility of the dialogue among the scien-
tific community. A review of the literature on
reaUsm in the philosophy of science, however,
seems to question whether scientists can so
easily be identified as realists.-^' If this is the
case, enactionism should not be rejected sim-
ply because it challenges traditional notions
of "objectivity" based on realism. In fact,
enactionism's view of the process of cogni-
tion as a coupling of knower and known, and
its emphasis on the influence of biological,
psychological, and cultural contexts on this
coupling, make it necessary to take all facets
of human experience seriously. Thus, not only
does enactionism support the idea of dialogue
between science and religion, it would expand
this to include other areas of human endeavor,
such as art.
An enactionist approach might also be
more inviting to religions other than Chris-
tianity. Judaism, and Islam— religions, that is,
that do not share a Western understanding of
personhood. I have challenged the dominance
of critical realism in so far as its adoption has
been the result of structural similarities to a
particular religious tradition, namely Chris-
tianity. To be fair, it must be asked whether
enactionism. with its roots in Buddhism,
would appeal mainly to Buddhists. If so. this
would cast doubt on the idea that it would be
more appropriate to a variety of religions than
critical reatism is.
In an attempt to bring theological ideas of
what the person is into hannony with modem
science, many Christian theologians have
emphasized that the Bible presents humans
as psychosomatic unities— both body and
soul. This can be understood to mean simply
that 1 am a soul residing inside a body. How-
ever, it can also be given a more integrative
interpretation in which body and soul are in-
tertwined, and "I" am not myself without both.
The latter is the view of those who wish to
bring theological anthropology more in line
with science. This view of the person would
not, I believe, have the difficulties with
enactionism that the former might. If this is
the case, then at least those Christians hold-
ing the more integrative view who are engaged
in the science-and-religion dialogue should
not feel alienated by enactionism.
These brief reflections on the possibilities
of enactionism for the science-and-religion
dialogue are not intended to argue that it is
the best approach. Rather, the point is to ques-
tion the dominance of critical realism, in part
by exploring a different epistemology. Real-
ism in general, much less critical realism in
particular, has not achieved nonnative status
in philosophy. Thus, its dominance in the field
of science and religion seems somewhat pe-
culiar. For those who go far enough to call it
a •"dogma," critical realism's prevalence
seenas incongruous with its own spirit of hold-
ing all theories as tentative.^- That is not to
say, however, that critical realism should be
rejected outright. It has worked fairly well for
the science-and-religion dialogue. From the
religious side, its view of the mind and insis-
tence that it is intelligibility, not observability,
that is the determiiung factor in ascribing "re-
ality," allow for a smooth integration with
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Christian theology. The emphasis on intelli-
gibility also makes sense from the perspec-
tive of science— especially physics, which has
been one of the most significant participants
in the dialogue from the science side. As the
dialogue becomes more diverse religiously,
however, new resources, like euactionism.
will come to the attention of Western schol-
ars and could take the dialogue in new and
exciting directions. This should not come at
the expense of critical realism. Having mul-
tiple epistemologies active in the science-and-
religion dialogue would, I beheve, be more
fruitful than having the dialogue dominated
by a single perspective, whatever it may be.
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